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Abstraet--A map of a qualitative differential game (game of kind) between two competing players with 
defined objectives i obtained by interfacing the state space decomposition btained from a study of four 
control problems, two for each player. Guaranteed winning regions, joint winning regions (mutual kill 
in combat games) and draw regions are defined and illustrated by examples. The analysis is continued 
to discuss semibarriers and barriers between guaranteed winning regions. The analysis is made using a 
Liapunov sutficiency approach rather than the Isaacs approach via necessary conditions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the initial work of Isaacs, over the past few decades there has been a resurgence in the study 
of differential game theory and its applications in many directions, perhaps most typically to 
pursuit-evasion problems and aerial combat games. The major part of this application has been 
concerned with the game of degree for zero sum deterministic differential games, and the maximum 
principle has been used as the main tool in the optimization process. An excellent summary of the 
research directions in pursuit-evasion and combat may be found in Ref. [1], later published in 
reduced form [2]. 
For games of the pursuit-evasion type, the game of kind has been analysed for the homicidal 
chauffer game [3, 4], the game of two cars [5, 6], with the latter being used as a model for aerial 
combat analysis [7-10]. There has been some study of such games using two targets: Pachter and 
Getz [6, 14], Davidovitz and Shinar [15], Getz and Leitmann [16], Stonier [17], and Stonier and 
Skowronski [18]. 
The first three cited papers approach the analysis of the game of kind via the traditional Isaacs 
approach using necessary conditions to find barriers, singular surfaces, etc. The analysis is usually 
complex and is even more complicated by moving to more realistic fan-shaped firing zones for the 
players. Furthermore, it does not yield a quick determination of the players' winning strategies and 
winning, or even approximate winning, regions. Major innovative ideas have been used by the 
authors to overcome difficulties uch as high dimension. A polar coordinate reference frame was 
used to obtain a complete analytic solution for the combat problem [15]. 
In Pachter and Getz [14] the authors use Liapunov sufficiency theorems to verify winning 
strategies and winning regions obtained from the analysis of necessary conditions. Of the papers 
cited, the latter three use a sufficiency approach for the two-target game. A Liapunov sufficiency 
technique applied to games was introduced by Skowronski in formalizing the Liapunov Game a 
decade ago [19, 20]. 
Getz and Leitmann [16] establish a sufficiency theorem involving the use of two functions we 
shall call Liapunov functions that yield a defining measure of the winning regions of the players 
under the single objective that each strives to reach his designated target whilst avoiding the other's. 
This study was complemented in Stonier and Skowronski [18] by considering the second objective 
in reversed roles of the players and introduced semibarriers and barriers between winning regions. 
It is well argued that the Liapunov approach as its problems, but today there is a vast and 
growing supply of literature on this method for controllability. The approach, however, has 
advantages. First and foremost, it is an approach to analyse a problem via sufficient conditions, 
not necessary conditions. If a player suspects by experience that a region is a winning region, it 
may be checked out against the sufficiency conditions. Moreover, as a routine, the suitable 
Liapunov function may be determined by constructing the boundary or a safe estimate of such a 
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region as a Liapunov level. In its application the Liapunov technique provides a determination of
winning strategies and winning regions of the players, although be it the region is obviously 
dependent upon the choice of functions used, and a "maximum" region may not be obtainable. 
Much research has been done using a variety of methods to determine the region of 
controllability in control problems, but this work has been mainly centred on stability and 
asymptotic stability without much concern for (stipulated) real time [cf. 21-23]. Negligible interest 
has been shown to be the equivalent problem in differential games due most probably to the 
complexity of the problem in which high dimensionality of the state space occurs even for the 
simplest idealized mathematical models. The indirect approach via necessary condition seems to 
be favoured. 
It has been noted by the authors in [2] and [11] that the pursuer-evader model is inadequate for 
aerial combat games due to the fact that there is no justification for a priori role assignment of 
pursuer and evader, which has been the concern of a number of papers such as [12] and [13]. 
Considering the problems of game formulation, strategy determination, role assignment, etc., 
particularly for combat games, they presented an examination of the combat problem from a 
strategy-analysis point of view. In [2] a strategy decision process whether to maximize or minimize 
an associated cost functional (game of degree) was based upon a knowledge of a division of the 
state space into winning, mutual kill and draw regions (game of kind). 
The study of the game of kind for the game of combat is of crucial importance to the decision 
making process. For the turret game in [2], this was done by analysis of the game of degree first 
incorporating the game of kind by placing state constraints in the optimization process. 
In this paper we shall analyse the division of state space for a qualitative differential game 
between two players by superimposing two dynamics games that require determination of 
controllable and strong controllable regions. We shall also discuss semibarriers and barriers 
associated with guaranteed winning regions. A sufficiency approach using known Liapunov 
results is used to analyse a number of simple examples associated with the turret game 
as in [1] and [2]. 
2. DYNAMIC MODELS OF THE GAME 
We write the game dynamics in the general form 
Y¢ = f (x ,  ul, u 2) (1) 
with the state vector x(t)  varying for t t> to = 0 in a given playing set A in the state space ~u, and 
with the control vectors ui(t), i = 1, 2, varying in given compact sets Ui of control constraints in 
the space of control values ~',, i = 1, 2, respectively. The values are selected by the players by means 
of the feedback control programs called strategies P"(.): A--. {all subsets of Ui}, generally set 
valued to cover discontinuities in the control functions u~(.), like bang-bang, etc. They are defined 
by u~(t) E P~(x(t)), t >. O. 
In order to accommodate he "strong" case of winning against all options of the opponent, we 
introduce two dynamic carriers in terms of the following contingent equations: 
Yc ~ {z = f (x ,  u', u2); u' ~ P'(x), uJ~ Uj}, (2) 
where i , j= l ,2 ,  i# j .  For suitable functions f( .) ,  P"(.), see Filippov [24], through each 
x(0) = x°~ A there are absolutely continuous olutions k(x°, .): R --* A of (2) generating curves in 
A called game-trajectories, and "conversely" one can find a pair u 1('), u2(') such that the trajectory 
k(ut(.) ,  u2('), x °, t), t >>. O, is a solution of (1). We denote the class of such trajectories by ~"~(x °) 
and call the strategy P~(.) that generates a nonvoid X't(x °) admissible at x °. The class of admissible 
strategies will be denoted ~,  and all Pt(.)s discussed subsequently will be assumed admissible 
everywhere on A unless otherwise stated. In view of the above, we callf(x, u j, u 2) the selector of 
the orientorfield on the fight-hand side of (2), and (1) the selector equation of (2). 
We may now introduce the attainability sets K(P  ~, x °, t) = {x = k(x  °, t); k(.) e oxr~(x°)}, and the 
reachable sets K(P  i, x °, [0, t]) = {K(P i, x °, t); t >I 0} at the instant t. The set K(P  ~, x °, R +) 
represents the strong semi-game for the player i, or briefly/-game. 
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It is assumed that A, a domain or closure of a domain in ~s,  is invariant: 
x°e A=~K(P ~, x °, R +) c A. If A = ~N, equation (1) is assumed to satisfy conditions o that no 
solution has finite escape time. 
3. QUALITATIVE D IFFERENTIAL  GAME 
A qualitative objective of player i is of the YES or NO type with respect o obtaining a payoff 
in terms of a certain objective property Q(i) of the trajectories of (1) on some nonempty subset 
of A. This property may be virtually anything specifying the state pattern provided it is well defined. 
We shall call the game competitive if Q(1) and Q(2) are different on the same subset of A and 
the players play in a competitive manner towards obtaining their objective property. The pursuit- 
evasion example of Stonier and Skowronski [18] is a competitive game, in which the evader seeks 
to reach a safety zone whilst avoiding capture by the pursuer and the pursuer seeks to capture the 
evader whilst avoiding the safety zone of the evader. 
It is normal to define some stopping condition which may be that the objective properties are 
required to be obtained in some finite time or that the game is terminated once one of the properties 
is attained. We shall make this stopping condition part of the composite objective in general 
discussion. 
4. / -CONTROLLABIL ITY  
The preliminary question to ask is whether player i's objective Q(i) is attainable at all. 
Considering therefore all possible selections of strategies of both players, this question is actually 
one of controllability for each of the players' defined objectives. We have termed it briefly 
/-controllability, controllability in favour of the player i. 
Definition 4.1 
We shall say the system (1) is i-controllable on S c A for Q(i) if and only if there is a pair 
(p~(.), p2(. )) such that all trajectories of Yf(x 0) generated on x ° ~ S by this pair of strategies exhibit 
property Q(i). 
The state x ° is called/-controllable for Q(i) and the set Aq being the maximal such S for which 
Definition 4.1 holds is called the region of i-controllability for Q(i). 
There obviously may be pairs (P ~(.), P:(.)) generating independently Q (1) and Q (2) on the same 
set in A, so that in general ~ Aq c~ Aq is nonempty. 
I 2 We shall call the set An = A\(AqwAq), if it is nonempty, the dead zone, a region of no 
controllability. If A~ = A (i = 1 or 2) the/-controllability is called complete. It indicates that there 
is a possibility of a player achieving his objective at each x0 ~ A depending, of course, if an 
appropriate strategy is undertaken by the other player. 
Example 4.1 
Let us examine the turret game in [2]. Player 1 moves in a plane with arbitrary velocity relative 
to a fixed reference frame (X, Y) and can turn a ray weapon relative to a fixed direction at a 
bounded angular ate a (see Fig. 1). Player 2 moves such that he is always at a distance R from 
player 1, and he can traverse this circle at an angular speed relative to a fixed direction at a bounded 
rate/~. Player 2 also has a ray weapon that he can turn relative to the line of sight between the 
two players at a bounded rate ~. 
In the relative reference frame (x, y) with origin at player l's position and the y axis along player 
l's weapon, let xl ffi fl - ~, x: = ~b, u ffi 4, vt ffi/~ and v~ ffi -q~. The kinematic equations of motion 
are  
.~, = v~ - u =f~(x~, x2, u, v~, v~); x~(O) = x °, 
~ = -v2  =A(x~,  x, ,  u, v~, v~); x2(O) = x °, 
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Fig. I. Turret game in fixed and relative reference frames. 
with xl and x2 being computed modulo 2n and where we take to = 0 since the system is autonomous. 
The playing space of interest is 
O = {(xl, x2); xl, x2 e [0, n]}. 
The controls are specified within bounds 0 ~< u ~< a, and 
v~,v2>/0 with ~+~<1.  
Vl V2 
The firing range of the weaponry is R and the target sets for player 1 are 
o~'l l = {(Xl, X2); Xl • El} = ,~ ,  
sr~ = {(xl, x2); x2 .< ~2} = sr~. 
Here the superscript denotes the player, while the subscript specifies its target or antitarget, 
whichever is the case. 
It is player l's objective Q(1) to drive the state x = (x,, x2) by selection of control variable u 
to hit the target set ~'I whilst avoiding the strike zone ,~'~ (of player 2). That is, there is a time 
t' > 0 for which x (0  ~ arl, and x(t) ¢ ~ for t ~ [0, T]. 
Likewise, player 2's objective Q(2) is to drive the state by selection of control variable (v,, v2) T 
to hit target set ~'~ whilst avoiding the strike zone ~-2 (of player 1). 
We shall assume the game is over when the appropriate target set is hit, t is assumed to range 
over [0, oo). Considering the defined objectives Q(l) and Q(2) we take k = D\ (~ I  u3"~). 
For the strategy pair defined by the selection u* = zi, v* = 0 and v~' = 0 (player 2 executes the 
null strategy), the state evolves according to ~l = -~7 and 22 = 0. 
For x ° e A, xl(t) will decrease from x~ to el whilst x2(t) remains constant at x ° > e2. We conclude 
that A~ = A. Similarly, we obtain k~ = A with the selection of the strategy pair u*= O, v* = O, 
v=* =~.  
This shows that/-controllability for i = l and 2 is complete. 
Remark 1 
In defining the player's qualitative objective property, we have specified that the state x(t) 
cannot lie in the opponent's firing zone at time/'. This means that even though l 2 Aq c~ Aq # 0 there 
is no pair (pi, p2) for which properties Q(1) and Q(2) hold together on the system trajectories 
of (1). (For convenience, we shall hen~forth delete the argument of pl and p2 unless it needs to 
be specified.) [] 
The above combat game featured combined qualitative objectives that consisted of reachability 
of a target set whilst ensuring avoidance of another set. The analysis in the above example was 
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straightforward. However, little research as been done in determining controllable r gions for such 
combined qualitative objectives. Some combined objectives investigated are those of collision with 
or without (permanent) capture [cf. 25, 26] and rendezvous and sequential collisions [27]. 
The theorem below can be used to obtain a 1-controllable r gion for the objective Q(I). It follows 
directly from the Getz-Leitmann theorem [16] which we state in Section 5, Theorem 5.1. 
A corresponding result is easily written for Q(2). 
Consider a quadruple {VI ( ' ) ,  V2(.),kl,k2} where V~(.):A~R l, i=  1, 2, are C l functions 
for which there exist constants C~ and (?2 such that (i) ~7 I~A~-{x•A;  VI(x) <<. C,}; 
(ii) 3", l c A 2 - {x • A; V2(x) ~< C2}; and (iii) kl > 0, ks are scalar constants. Let 
W,(V,, Vs,k,,ks) = x •A\(3"I~A2); V,(x) -  C, > V2(x)- C2 " 
Theorem 4.1 
If there exists a quadruple {V~(.), Vs(.),kt, k2 }, and a strategy pair (/~t, p2) such that for 
all x•Wl(V,,V2,kl ,k2) and for all ul•/~l, u2•ff 2, VVl(x)f(x, ul, u2)<.N-kl<O and 
VV2(x)f(x, u l, u 2) >t -k2, then WI(VI, V2, kl, k2) is a 1-controllable r gion. 
5. STRONG /-CONTROLLABILITY 
Suppose now that we have a qualitative competitive game between two players in which A~ 
and A 2 are nonempty. Is it possible that player 1 can attain his objective Q(1) independent ofany 
strategy used by player 2? The corresponding mood of play is called strong [see 24], with the 
dynamic arrier (2) of what we called the/-game. 
Definition 5.1 
The system (1) is called strongly i-controllable at x ° for Q(i) if and only if there is a P~ such that 
all trajectories of ~e'~(x °) of (2) generated at an x°e S possess property Q(i). 
As before, we say that x ° is called strongly/-controllable for Q(i), and the maximal S is called 
the region A~ of strong/-controllability for Q(i), briefly/-winning region. Any subset of A~ is 
strongly/-controllable for Q(i), and the corresponding strategy pt is a winning strategy. Let us 
denote the class of such strategies by ~,  c ~.  Clearly A~ c A~. 
Obviously a knowledge of A~ and A~ for the players is extremely important in the decision of 
strategy selection. Each can be guaranteed of achieving his objective if he plays the correct control 
program. Indeed, in A~ c~ A~, if it is nonempty, both objectives may be attainable on the system 
trajectories. 
The question of how to find A~ or an approximation to it is obviously dependent upon the choice 
of Q (i). The Getz-Leitmann theorem provides aLiapunov sufficiency result which gives an estimate 
of the winning regions. It is presented here for reference. 
Theorem 5.1 (Getz-Leitmann theorem) 
If there exists a quadruple {1"1 ("), V2(" ), kl, k2 }, a strategy p l(. )•  ~t and a function/~l(.): A 
all nonempty subsets of U~, such that 
(i) /~t(x, t) = Pl(x) V(x, t) • A x RI; 
(ii) Vx • Wl(Vl, V2, k~,k2) and Vu~epl(x), 
sup VVj(x)f(x, u l, u 2) <~ --kl, 
u 2 ~ U 2 
inf VV2(x)f(x, u l, u s) >1 -k2: 
u2~U 2
and (iii) A is an invariant set of (2) with P~(.)--/~l(.) and all p2(. )e~s,  or else A =~N, then 
W~(V~, I"2, kl, ks) is a winning set for player 1. (The notation relative to the definition of W ~ has 
been given in Section 4. A corresponding result may be written for player 2.) 
C.A.M.W.A. 18/t-~J 
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Example 5.1 
(A) Consider first the 1-game, strong controllability for player 1. For application of the 
Getz-Leitmann theorem, we take V, = x~ and V2 = x2 with C1 = El and (72--E2 where 
or,, ~ A, = {(x,, x2); v, ~ c,}, 
er~ c a2 = {(x,, x2); v2 ~< c~}. 
We need to find constants kl, k2, k~ > 0, such that for each 
xs  Wl = (x~,x2)~a; V,(x)-C~ > V2(x) -  G 
there exists a control program P~(.) such that for every u* ~P~(x), 
sup VVI "f(x, u*, vl, v2) ~< --kl < 0, (3) 
Vl, v2 
inf VV2"f(x, u*, vl, v2)/> -k2. (4) 
Vl, 1-' 2 
WI then constitutes a winning region for player 1, W~ c A~. From (3), we obtain 
rY~ - u ~< -k~ < 0. (5) 
For a positive k, to exist, this necessarily implies that t~l - ~ ; that is, ~,'1 = t~j/ti < 1. Select he control 
program for player 1 to be u* = ~ for all time. Then the largest k~ compatible with (5), independent 
of the state, is kl = u - v~. From (4), we obtain 
k2/> ~,. (6) 
The smallest k2 compatible with (6), independent of state, is k2 = ~2. So for y~ < 1, setting Y2 = ~2/6, 
we have 
W' { x , -E l  >x2t~2 }_E2 
= (xl'x2)sA;x2--e2> 1--71 
WI is a subset of A~ for it is easily shown by integrating the state equations that if player 1 always 
selects control u* he will win from all initial conditions satisfying (x2-  E2)> ~2(xt-~1). (The 
greatest effect player 2 can have on the outcome is when his control selection is vl = 0 and v2 - ~, 
to give the greatest rate of decrease of x2 towards ¢2.) 
So W~ is an underestimate of A~. We have 
a b = {(x,, x~); (x~ - E~) > ~(x ,  - E,)}. 
For Vl t> l, clearly Ab ffi 0. 
(B) Consider now the strong game for player 2, the 2-game. Take V~ = x2 and V 2 = x~ with Cm -- ¢2 
and (72 ffi ¢~ where 3 "2 = A~ and ~-2 ~ A2" Then the corresponding equations to (3) and (4) are 
sup VVj "f(x, u, v*, v*) ~< -k t  < O, (7) 
it 
inf VV2.f(x, u, v*, v*) >i -k  2, (8) 
u 
where the program of selection of v*, v~' for player 2 is to be determined. From (7), we obtain 
-v2 ~< -k~ < 0. (9) 
This necessarily requires the selection of v2 to be nonzero. From (8), we obtain 
/<2 I> fi -- yr. (10) 
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Equations (9) and (10) are independent of the state variables. From (9), a maximum value of k~ 
is given by k~ = g2/(1 + 6) for a selection of v~' = g2/(l + 6) with 6 ~[0, oo). This means that 
acceptable values for vl satisfy 
O~<vl~< 1 1+6 gt - ' -~vv  
Hence we can write, selecting the smallest ks in (10), given a value of v~, 
k: a -/16~,/(1 + 6) 
k, t72/(1 + 6) 
1 + 60  - fly,) = with fl ~ [0, 1]. 
Y2 
Now, provided 7~ ~ l, that is, Vl ~< 6, the smallest value of k2/k~ is obtained when 6 = 0. So 
kE/kl = 1/72 when v* = v2 and v* = 0. The maximum winning region for player 2, considering the 
result for A~, is 
For 77 > 1, it is possible with fl = 1 to select 6 sufficiently large, this defining the selection of v* 
and v* to make the above expression for k~/kl negative. Equivalently, for ?j > 1 we can select a 
//E (0, 1) such that//g~ = ft. Then we require that player 2 play v* = figs, v* = g,(l - fl). In this case 
then, A~ must be all of A. [] 
Remark 2 
In this example, it is seen that A~ c~ A~ = 0. [] 
Remark 3 
Even though the qualitative objective for player 1 (similarly for player 2) is defined in terms of 
reachability of ~-t, the Getz-Leitmann theorem ensures that there is penetration of the target set. 
6. MAP OF THE GAME 
In addressing the conflict in a competitive two-person game, we need to define a strategy selection 
procedure for the players. This can be established by examining the decomposition of the state 
space, that has been defined through the definitions of controllability given in the previous two 
sections. 
6.1. State Space Decomposition 
Let us consider the regions W I 1 2 W 2 ~ ~ W ~ = A~\AQ and = A \AQ. In particular, for all states in there 
exist winning strategies, belonging to P[ ,  for which the game is strongly 1-controllable, but not 
strongly 2-controllable. If player 1 does not play a strategy in P~,, he loses his guarantee of 
achieving his objective Q(I) independent of player 2's actions. The objective Q(1) may be then 
achieved only if player 2 plays a suitable strategy, since A~ c A~. A similar situation exists for 
player 2. 
Such strategies in P~, we may term as guaranteed winning strategies for the players. Regions W ~ 
and W' are called the guaranteed winning regions of the players. 
I 2 For states in AQ r~ Ao, assuming it is nonempty, only if players take their strategies from P~, 
respectively, each player can be assured of achieving his objective on the resulting system 
trajectories of (1). We can define this region as the guaranteed joint winning region. 
We may ignore those x°e An, the dead zone, in our discussion. 
Consider now the relative complement C(A~uA~)= t 2 i , .  (Aq u Aq) - (AQ u Ao), assuming it is 
nonempty. From the definition of strong controllability, we find that for x ° ~ C(A~ u A~): (i) To 
each strategy PI of player 1, there exists a strategy P~(P') of player 2 such that there is at least 
one trajectory of (1) that does not have property Q(I); and (ii) To each strategy p2 of player 2, 
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there exists a strategy P~(P2) for player 1 such that there is at least on trajectory of (1) that does 
not have property Q(2). 
If such x°e A~, we know there exists a pair ~1, ~ such that every resulting trajectory of (1) has 
property {2(1). Suppose player 1 persists in playing strategy £ol. If player 2 plays strategy ~p2, he 
will certainly let player 1 achieve his objective. There is no certainty of his achieving Q(2) unless 
x ° also belongs to A~ and (~,1, ~p2) is a pair of strategies for which every resulting trajectory of (1) 
has the qualitative property Q(2). However, player 2 may choose to play p{~(~l) known to exist 
[(i) above]. He then ensures that player 1 cannot achieve his objective Q(1). But again if x ° e A~ 
and the pair (~t, p2,(~t)) is sufficient for 2-controllability at x °, player 2 may still achieve his 
objective Q(2). 
1 2 If such x ° e mq\mq, player 2 can and, we assume, will force what one may term a draw by playing 
p2.(p~) for each strategy p1 of player 1. [Neither of the properties Q(1) and Q(2) are attainable 
on trajectories under this strategy selection.] Similarly, if such x ° 2 Aq\mq, player 1 will force a draw. 
We shall therefore call the set of these x °, 
O l 2 1 2 1 2 = [Aq\(Aq u Ao)] U [Aq\ (Aq  t..) AQ) ]  D2 U 31 ,  
the guaranteed raw region of the game, where Di is the guaranteed draw region for player i. If 
| 2 x 0 E Aq\Aq player 2's guaranteed raw strategy will be to play p~(pI) for each pi of player 1. If 
2 I x0 e Aq\Aq, player 1's draw strategy will be to play P~.(P~) for each P2 of player 2. 
1 ~ A2p What are the outcomes of the game if such x ° e Aq f ~ aq. There are four possibilities; each may 
or may not occur: (a) player 1 achieves Q(1), player 2 does not achieve Q(2); (b) player 1 does 
not achieve Q(1), player 2 achieves Q(2); (c) both players achieve their objectives; (d) both players 
do not achieve their objectives. 
For this reason, we can call this region the region of no guaranteed outcome. 
In summary then, the set A is seen to divide into six regions: (1) guaranteed winning region for 
player 1, WI; (2) guaranteed winning region for player 2, W:; (3) guaranteed joint winning region, 
WI2= A~oA~; (4) guaranteed raw region, D t 2 t 2 t ~ . = [Aq\(Aqu AO) ] u [Aq\(AqL) AO)], (5) dead zone, 
A~ = A\(A~uA~); (6) region of no guaranteed outcome, RNGO = (A~c~ Aq)\(AQnAo). 2 1 2 
Remark 4 
In those games in which a terminal time T* is specified, there may be x ° in A~ for which 
player 1 cannot achieve his objective Q(1) within this specified time, but would do so if time T* 
was extended. A similar case would exist for x°e A~. Under the former analysis, these x ° would 
belong to A,. It would be realistic in some games, for example the turret game, to define the union 
of D and A~ as the draw region [1]. [] 
Remark 5 
If RNGO -- 0, and assuming we can ignore the region of no play, the dead zone A,, or effectively 
redefine A to be that set of states for which play in the game is possible, the game consists of winning 
strategies in the regions 1-4. [] 
6.2. Preference Ordering 
In any game we need to establish a preference ordering to decide the player's choice of strategy. 
Such an ordering in general will be dependent upon the player's given objective. We shall assume 
in the competitive game that player i will always play: 
First preference. Pl: choose to play that strategy which guarantees his objective Q(i) 
independent of action by player j and is such that player j cannot also achieve his qualitative 
property Q(j)  on the system trajectories before the conclusion of the game, j # i (guaranteed 
winning). 
Second preference. P2: choose to play that strategy that guarantees his objective Q(i) independent 
of action by player j but allows that player j may also achieve his qualitative property Q(j)  on 
the system trajectories before the conclusion of the game, j # i (guaranteed joint winning). 
Third preference. P3: choose to play that strategy that guarantees player j cannot achieve Q(j)  
when he himself has no guarantee of achieving his own objective Q(i) on the system trajectories 
before the conclusion of the game, j # i (guaranteed draw). 
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Fourth preference. P4: when no guarantee is given as in the above preferences, he may choose: 
(i) to play a strategy that will achieve his property Q(i) in the hope that playerj  will play an 
appropriate strategy; (ii) if (i) is not possible, to play that strategy which will result in a draw with 
neither objective being obtainable on the system trajectories before the conclusion of the game. 
This ranking of preferences is not rigid. In a combat game in which a joint win under appropriate 
definition of objectives would result in destruction for both combatants, the players would most 
probably prefer to place the outcome of a draw as second preference. Some further discussion may 
be found in [1] where strategy selection is also extended to include minimization/maximization of 
cost functions associated with each player's actions--the game of degree. 
Let us now return to analysis of the turret game. 
6.3. Turret Game: Strategy Analysis 
We have found that in the turret game 
W]={(x: ,x2)EA;x2-Q>r2(x: - -e] )}  fo ry :< l ;  
W:=O for 7:t>1; 
W 2={(x: ,xz )eA;x2-ez<~2(x: -e : )}  for~:~<l; 
W 2=h for~/ :>l .  
In the case ~,: > 1 (Fig. 2c), player 2 is guaranteed of a win in all of A with objective Q(2); 
player 1 cannot hope to win unless player 2 does not play one of his guaranteed winning strategies. 
For the two remaining cases (Figs 2a and 2b), there exist points in A not in W: and W 2, belonging 
to A~ n A~; that is, belonging to the region of no guaranteed outcome. In case (a) we recognize the 
region of no guaranteed outcome as {x:, x2) e A; x2 - e2 = ~2(x~ - e:)}, as the barrier for the game 
in the sense of Isaacs. 
These results may be compared with those given for minimum time pursuit-evasion a alysis for 
the turret game in [1]. However, it must be noted that the qualitative objectives defined here for 
the players do not allow for both target sets to be reached simultaneously. 
(o) 
w! RNGO 
. /  w2 
¢; 
xz~ (b)  
~2 
X 
(c l  
f l '  w 2 
II 1 'ff "~ G1 II 1 T X 1 
Fig. 2. 
6.4. Illustrative Examples 
Some of the following examples have been constructed to illustrate the reasoning developed in 
the previous subsections. 
Example 6.1 
Consider the turret game with the added requirement for it to be completed in the interval [0, Tf), 
T r = n/4. Assume e~ = c2 = n/4, a = 2, ~: = 1 and v2 = 2. We determined previously that Aq ~ = A with 
v~ = 0, v2 = 0 and u nonzero. It is now restricted to 
A~ = {(x:, x2) e A; x: < 3n/4}, 
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this being the maximum region for which the trajectory enters ~'I, being specified by maximum 
u = 2. Similar reasoning yields 
Consequently, we have 
- 3~/4}. 4~  {(x,, x~) e 4;  x~ < 
W' = {(xl, x2) ~ A; x: > x~ and x, < 3n/4}, 
W 2 = {(x,, x:) e 4; x: < xl and x2 < 3n/4}. 
A dead zone now exists; it is 
4, = {(x~, x~) e A; xl, x2/> 3~r/4}, 
and a region of no guaranteed outcome 
RNGO = {(xl, x:) ~ A; x2 = x, and x, < 3n/4}. 
The state space decomposition is shown in Fig. 3. 
x21 
T[ 
3~ 
4 
Wt l A I n 
,:,,<~]w-,-~#rrt,' ~A~ 
~'*'~ ..2 I 
IT/4 IT/2 311"/4 1i" x I 
Fig. 3. State decomposition, Example 6.1. 
Example 6.2 
Consider the turret game with targets 
.~'1 l = {(XI,X2)~A;xI <E l and x2 ~> q+'5},  
f~ = {(xl,x2)~A;x2<e2 and xl >---El +'5}, 
and the same qualitative objectives of the players. This corresponds to the '5 game described by 
the authors in [1]. 
It is found that for y~ < 1, 
lm A~ - {(x~, x~) E 4; x: >I E2 + ,5 }, 
AZq -- A, 
W ~ = a b = {(xl, x2) E A; x~ m (q  + '5) t> y~(X~ -- E,)}, 
W 2 ffi 4~ ffi {(Xl, XD~A;  X~ -- q ~< ~2(Xl -- (q + '5))}, 
RNGO -- {(xl, x~) ~ 4; y~(xl - (El + 6)) + q < X2 < ~2(Xl -- q) + e2 + '5 and x~ > e2 + '5}, 
Di = {(xl,x2)~A;et <x l  <El +'5 and x2>y~(xt-(el +6))+e2}.  
The decomposition of state is shown in Fig. 4, which illustrates the draw region Dr. By always 
selecting control u* player 1 can prevent he state from entering $',~, yet he has no possibility of 
achieving his objective on the system trajectories. The guaranteed winning regions are now disjoint 
and separated by the region of no guaranteed outcome. 
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Fig. 4. State decomposition, Example 6.2. 
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Example 6.3 
Consider the turret game with the same system dynamics and objectives (no time restriction) but 
with E, = 7r/4, E2 = 7r/4 and with control selection given by u ~ [1, 2], v~ e [0, 1] and v2 ~ [1, 2]. The 
following state decomposition is easily determined and shown in Fig. 5: 
W' = {(x], x2) e A; x~ > 2x, - n/4}, 
W: = {(x,, x2) e A; x2 < 2Xl - n/4}, 
A~ = {(x,, x2) e A; x, > x,/2 + rr/8}, 
A~ = A, 
z$. --- 0,  
RNGO = {(xl, x:) e A; x2 = 2xl - n/4}. 
X 2 
'IT 
1 
¢1 
2 W l ~'~2 ~'~ W 
,~ ~--,"~" 
~/4 
~2=A 
q 
'IT x 1 
Fig. 5. State decomposition, Example 6.3. 
The set A in this example is separated into the two strong winning regions by the set 
B = {(xt, x2)eA; x2 - -2x , -  n/4}. This set is in fact the region of no guaranteed outcome, it is 
semipermeable and the barrier for the game in the sense of Isaacs. [] 
Example 6.4 
Consider the game described in Example 6.3 with a slight change in the qualitative objectives 
of the players. Namely that for Q(1) it is allowed for x(O e ~'~ when x(f) e ~'I, similarly for Q(2) 
(mutual kill). 
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It is easy to show that 
A~ --. {(x,, x2) E A; X 2 ) 2x, - rG4}, 
A~ = {(x,, x2) • A; xz ~< 2x, - ~/4}, 
Atq = {(xl, x~) • A; x2 >t xl/2 + rt/8}, 
Aq 2 = A. 
We now have a region of joint win 
W '2 = Ab n t~ 
= {(x~, xz)  • A; x2 = 2xl - n /4} ,  
and the joint winning strategies are determined by u~ = 2, v~ = 1 and v~ = 2. 
6.5. Comments 
We see from the above analysis and examples that determination f the map requires the analysis 
of four control problems and their interface to yield a decomposition of the state space, finding 
A~, A2q, A b and A~. Determination of what choice of control a player makes in these regions is 
another matter. 
The strong game against an opponent has featured in many publications in differential games. 
It entails the idea of a "very powerful" program that dominates all influence of controls used by 
the other player. In modem aircraft combat games and many other present applications, this 
superiority of control for a given player does not in general exist. One would therefore xpect he 
guaranteed winning regions W I and W E to be small in comparison with the other regions, and that 
the other regions such as the draw and the region of no guaranteed outcome play more of an 
important role with respect o the decision process. 
The study of the game in these regions requires more detailed analysis to the extent of identifying 
the opposing player's control strategy. 
The above examples also highlight he need for "barrier" analysis between all defined regions. 
In the next section we will discuss a "barrier" analysis between guaranteed winning regions. 
7. SEMIBARRIERS,  BARRIERS 
7.1. Nonpermeable Surfaces 
In many examples discussed in literature, the major interest has been in determining the 
guaranteed winning regions, and for conflicting objectives, these regions are nonintersecting as seen 
in the previous examples. Separating these regions are surfaces that have been called semibarriers 
by the authors in previous papers [18, 27]. In this work we shall change the notation slightly to 
be more consistent with Isaacs' definitions of semipermeable and barrier surfaces. 
We now consider cases in which Wt= A~ are not both void and W 1 n W 2 = 0. 
The set A~v = A\A~ will be called a semi-neutral zone for player i, or briefly i-neutral zone, as 
player i may not win strongly from this region. Obviously, 
c(a~ua:Q) = (a ' .n  ' ~ A,) u (ANn a , )  = (a~ n A~) n (a'~ u a~). 
Consider now a surface S i that separates A into two disjoint sets A t and N (j ¢ i) with the 
property that: 
Given x ° e S t there is an admissible strategy f (j # i) such that K(P j, x °, t) n A t = O for t/> 0. 
Such a surface S t, St c A~, if it exists, we will call nonpermeable for player i or i-nonpermeable. 
Furthermore, let us specify N as that set which encloses W t if it is nonzero, and call it the interior 
of S t, while A j c A~ will be called the exterior of S t (see Fig. 6). 
Remark 6 
We shall assume in general discussion here that time may be continued over [0, oo); obvious 
changes can be made for t ¢ [0, Tf). 
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When S i is a smooth surface with nonzero gradient nt= (n~ . . . . .  n~v) directed away from the 
interior A ~, we conclude from the definition a necessary condition for S g, namely that x e S i implies 
the existence of PJ with uJe PJ(x) such that 
ni.f(x, uJ, uJ)>~O, i=1 ,2 ,  (11) 
for all u~e Ug. This means that the angle ? between vectors n ~ andf i s  less than 90 ° (see Fig. 6). 
The following theorem gives sufficient conditions to confirm any candidate for S i, possibly 
produced by equation (11). 
Theorem 7.1 
A surface S i partitioning A into two disjoint sets A ~ and A j is i-nonpermeable if there is a C I 
function Vi: A - - ,R  I and  a strategy PJ such that for all x cA ;  (i) V~(x) < V~(z) for all z eS  ~, and 
(ii) for each uJe PJ(x) 
VVi(x) ' f (x,  u i, u j) >1 0 
for all u~ U~, i q:j. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Suppose x° e S ~ and for strategy pl there is a solution k(x°, .) 
with trajectory in ~/j(x °) that enters Ai; that is, there is a time t~ > to such that 
k(x °, tl) ~ A i. 
Now from condition (ii), 
V'(x(t,)) > V'(x°). 
This inequality contradicts the inequality in (i), so we conclude that no trajectory of .,~f'j(x °)
enters A i. [] 
Remark 7 
Notice that the argument of the proof remains valid when the inequalities in (i) and (ii) are 
simultaneously reversed. 
Remark 8 
We observe that condition (ii) may be used to generate the opposing player's strategy PL 
Let 
L i(x, u I, u 2) = VVi(x)f(x, u I, u 2) 
146 J .M .  SKOWRONSKI and R. J. STONIER 
define the L iapunov derivative. Then supposing i = 1 and j = 2, condition (ii) of  Theorem 7.1 is 
met for strategy selection p2 if it is selected using the inequality 
L l(x, u I, u 2) = max L l(x, u I, u 2) >>. 0 
u 2 
for all u 1~ U I and u 2eP2(x) .  [] 
Example 7.1 
We now return to the originally defined turret game, Example 4.1. In particular, we discuss the 
case ~,j < 1 here. The two winning regions W j and W 2 are 
W' = {(x , ,  x2) e a ;  x2 - E2 > ~2(x,  - e, )},  
w 2 = {(x l ,  x2) e A; x2 -- e2 > ~2(x,  - eh} .  
We shall confirm that B = {(xl, x2) e A; x2 - e2 = ~'2(xl - e~)} is nonpermeable for player l and 
player 2. 
(A ) l-nonpermeable. Take 
W' c A j = {(x~, x2) e A; x2 - -  e2 > ~2(x, - e0} ,  
Az= W 2, 
V~(x,, x2) = 1 - (x2 -- Q) + ])2(Xl - -  e l ) ,  
V ~ is a C ~ function and V j -= 1 on B with V~(x~, x2) < 1 for all (x~, x2) ~ A l, so condition (i) of  
Theorem 7.1 is fulfilled: 
VV I ' f  = v2+~2(v l -  u) 
=v2+~vj -~u.  
u /z 
Maximizat ion of  VV ~ . f  with respect to v~, vz, given the constraints vl/O~ + v2/~2 <<. 1, v~, v2 >I O, is 
a simple linear programming problem with maximizat ion given by v2 = v2 and v~ = 0. Then 
VV' . f  = 62( 1 - u/6). 
We see that VV I . f  >/0 for all 0 ~< u ~< 6, so condition (ii) is satisfied for this selection of  strategy 
of  player 2. 
Hence B is l -nonpermeable by Theorem 7.1. 
(B) 2-nonpermeable. Take 
A 2 = W 2, 
N = {(x j ,  x2)  ~ A; x2 - e2 > ~2(x,  - eL)}, 
V2(x~, x2) = 1 + x2 - e2 - ~2(x~ - ej).  
V 2 is a C I function and V 2= 1 on B with V2(xl, x2)< 1 for all (xt, x2)e h 2. Now 
VV2"f = -~2(v~ - u)  - v2 
= --"~/)1 - -  1)2 " [ - - -  U" u t7 
The max imum Vv 2. f  with respect to u is attainable when u = ~. So using u = ~, 
17 V 2 . f  = v2 - v2 - v2 ~v~ 
o E' v v:] 
- -  0 
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Now for 6~ ~< a we have 
0 ...< ~ + ~ ...< vl _ -=-+~< 1. 
u /32 /31 /32 
This means that V V 2.f/> 0 for all admissible/3,,/3:. The conditions of Theorem 7.1 are fulfilled, 
so B is 2-nonpermeable. [] 
Example 7.2 
Consider the turret game with 71 = 1. In this case there is only the strong winning region for 
player 2, W2; W I = 0. An examination of results (A) and (B) in Example 7.1 shows that in this 
case cO W 2 is still both nonpermeable for player 1 and player 2. [] 
Example Z3 
Using a similar construction and proof to that given in Example 7.1, it is easy to show in 
Example 6.2 (case 71 < 1) that 
cOW 1 is 2-nonpermeable, 
cOW 2 is 1-nonpermeable. [] 
7.2. Semibarriers 
Whether the boundary of W ~, cOW ~ is nonpermeable for either player is dependent upon the 
"strength" of the other player's strategy on cOW i through the dynamic equations to prevent 
penetration i to W( 
We make the following definition of a semibarrier that is slightly different o the one given in 
the previously cited work. The barrier concept here defined related to any i-nonpermeable surface 
in the terminology of this paper. 
Definition 7.1 
The boundary of W ~, cO W ~, shall be called a semibarrier for player i if it is j-nonpermeable, j # i. 
From the examples discussed, we have for the turret game, Example 6.1, 
Case 71 < 1: cOW1= B is a semibarrier for player 2, 
cOW2= B is a semibarrier for player 1, 
W 2 is a semibarrier for player 1, Case 71 = 1: 
and Example 6.2, 
cOW ~ is a semibarrier for player 2, 
cOW 2 is a semibarrier for player 1. 
7.3. Semipermeable S ts 
It was found in Example 7.1 (A) and (B) and in Example 7.2 that cO W 2 was both 1-nonpermeable 
and 2-nonpermeable. 
This means for x°~ cO W: that (i) there exists a p2 such that 
K(P : ,x° , t )nA l=O for t~>0, 
and (ii) there exists a p i such that 
K(PI, x° , t ) r~W:=O for t >>.O. 
Here A I =A\(W2ucOW:). On this surface cOW: that partitions A into disjoint sets, there is the 
possibility for player 2 to prevent penetration i to A I and for player 1 to prevent penetration i to 
W:. As the surface cO W 2 is both 1,2-nonpermeable, w  are tempted to call it a nonpermeable surface. 
However, following the notation of Isaacs [3], we use the term semipermeable for cOW 2 and make 
the following definition. 
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Definition 7.2 
Given i-nonpermeable surfaces S t and S:, we call a nonempty S =StnS  2 a semipermeable 
surface. 
Our definition incorporates the extended case when S is not a surface that partitions A into two 
disjoint sets but consists of small portions of the surfaces under discussion that separate the 
neighbouring space. 
Assuming that at points on S there exists a continuous varying normal, we have at a particular 
point x E S, n ~ = -n  2. For x 6 S, using equation (11), it is necessary that (i) there exists a/~2 for 
which 
n t . f (x ,  u 1, ~2) >10 (12) 
for all u~E U, and a~eP2(x), and (ii) there exists a /~ for which 
for all u2~ U2 and u I ~ J~ l (x ) .  
Furthermore, equation (12) implies 
and equation (13) implies 
n 2 "f(x,  ~l, u 2) i> 0 (13) 
min max n I " f (x,  u 1, u s) >/0 
U I U2 
min max n I " f (x,  u I, u 2) ~< 0. 
u I u 2 
We conclude that for x ¢ S it is necessary that 
rain max n I . f (x ,  u l, u 2) = 0 (14) 
U 1 U 2 
and moreover this is attainable for the strategy pair (/~, p2). 
Equation (14) is the necessary semipermeability condition of Isaacs. If S is a Liapunov level, then 
it becomes 
rain max VV . f (x ,  u ~, u 2) = 0. (15) 
u I u 2 
7.4. Barrier 
Suppose in a competitive game that semibarriers B 1 and B 2 exist for the players. We make the 
following definition. 
Definition 7.3 
Given semibarriers B ~ and B 2 exist, we call B = B~:~ B 2, if it is nonempty, the barrier surface. 
From the semibarrier definition, we conclude that the barrier is a semipermeable surface and that 
it partitions A locally into winning regions W t and W 2. For the barrier surface, the necessary 
condition equation 05) holds. 
Furthermore, by the definition of the semibarriers, the barrier surface is unique. Thus, if it is 
nonempty, it is a unique semipermeable surface separating W t, W E. 
A selected semipermeable surface may be checked against sufficient conditions, and if con- 
firmed, become the barrier. The conditions consist of using Theorem 7.1 twice, "on both sides of 
the candidate surface". 
Example  7.3 
Let us now return to Example 6.3. It is seen that the surface 
B -- OW I - 0W ~ -- {(xl ,  x : )  ~ A; x: = 2xl - n/4} 
partitions A into disjoint sets W ~ and W 2. We verify here via the Liapunov sufficiency analysis that 
this surface is the barrier surface for the game. 
Two-person qualitative differential games with two objectives 149 
B is l-nonpermeable. Take At= W l, A 2= W 2 and Vl(xt,x2)= 1-x2+2x, - -n /4  for all 
(xl ,x2)eA ~. V l is a C I function and V I= I  on B with Vl (x l ,x2)<l  for all (x , ,xs )eN.  
Now 
VV t "f  = 2(v,  - u)  + vs. 
The maximum value of VV ~ . f  with respect o v~ and vs is attainable when v, = 1 and vs = 2. For 
this selection, 
VVl . f  = 4 - 2u >>.0 
for all u E [1, 2]. 
The surface B is l-nonpermeable by Theorem 7.1. 
B is 2-nonpermeable. Take AS= W s, A l= W ~, and V2(xt,xs)= 1 +xs -2x ,  +n/4  for all 
(xt, xs) ~ A s. V s is a C ~ function and V t - 1 on B with VS(xl, xs) < 1 for all (xt, xs) ~ A s. 
Now 
VVS' f  = -2(vt - u) - vs 
= - -2V  I - -  V s + 2U.  
The maximum value of V V s ' f  with respect o u is attainable when u = 2. For this selection, 
VVS' f  = - 2vl - v2 + 4 >I0 
for all vl ~ [0, 1] and vs e [1, 2]. 
The surface B is thus 2-nonpermeable by Theorem 7.1. 
Since At= W' and AS= W s, we see that B is both a semibarrier for player 1 and player 2, 
B = B '= B s. By definition it is semipermeable and the barrier surface for the game. [] 
In this example, the barrier B is a level of V' and equation (15) is seen to be satisfied by the 
selection of strategies 
P ' :  u = 1 
/~2: v l= l  and vs=2. 
For a given x ° E B, the resulting solution of (1) for this strategy pair, k(x °, .), remains in B finally 
reaching (n/4, n/4)eY']c~Y'~. Both players 1 and 2 reach their target sets Y'] and ~ar~, whilst 
avoiding targets Y'~ and Y'] respectively, at the same time. This corresponds to a mutual kill 
as defined in [1]. But neither player obtains his qualitative objective as they have been defined 
here. 
The barrier set B, we have noted in this example, is the region of no guaranteed outcome. We 
see in this example that the players must play the strategies P~ and/~ to force a no win situation, 
to maintain the trajectory from a given x°e B on the barrier, otherwise not to do so will result 
in a win for the other player. 
Remark 9 
In general study, the barrier B will be invariant, under the action of strategies pt and p2 defining 
the min-max in equation (15) until the game reaches termination. [] 
7.5. Determining the Barriers 
Our discussion in this section has centred on the determination of nonpermeable and semiper- 
meable sets, semibarriers and barriers for the strong game. We may summarize the analysis to find 
the barrier as follows: (i) Determine the boundaries of the winning regions W' and W 2. (ii) Prove 
d W ~ is j-nonpermeable; that is, it is the semibarrier B~. (iii) Determine the intersection of B I and 
B:. Clearly step (i) is critical--to find the maximal winning regions W ~ and W 2. 
Our direction here has been to establish a "sutt~ciency" approach [step (ii)] to determine points 
on the barrier rather than the necessary approach of Isaacs taken by other authors. This analysis 
in the above examples was clearly dependent upon finding a functional form for the boundaries 
W I and 0 W 2. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper  we sought firstly to present an analysis of  a qual i tat ive differential game between 
two players in character iz ing the state space by determin ing / -cont ro l lab le  and  s t rong/ -cont ro l lab le  
regions, i = 1, 2. There were essential ly four  contro l  problems,  two determin ing Aq ~ and  A~ and two 
in which each player plays to achieve his objective independent  of  the other  (strong game), 
determin ing A~ and A~. 
For  the st rong game we presented an  analysis for determin ing the barr ier  between strong w inn ing  
regions us ing a L iapunov  sufficiency approach.  The basic map of  the game, semibarr ier  and  barr ier  
analysis was i l lustrated on the simple turret game, a game of  kind. 
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